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Attention to Attributes and Objects in Working Memory
Nelson Cowan, Christopher L. Blume, and J. Scott Saults
University of Missouri
Abstract
It has been debated on the basis of change-detection procedures whether visual working memory
is limited by the number of objects, task-relevant attributes within those objects, or bindings
between attributes. This debate, however, has been hampered by several limitations, including the
use of conditions that vary between studies and the absence of appropriate mathematical models to
estimate the number of items in working memory in different stimulus conditions. We re-
examined working memory limits in two experiments with a wide array of conditions involving
color and shape attributes, relying on a set of new models to fit various stimulus situations. In
Experiment 2, a new procedure allowed identical retrieval conditions across different conditions of
attention at encoding. The results show that multiple attributes compete for attention, but that
retaining the binding between attributes is accomplished only by retaining the attributes
themselves. We propose a theoretical account in which a fixed object capacity limit contains
within it the possibility of the incomplete retention of object attributes, depending on the direction
of attention.
Investigators disagree about a fundamental aspect of working memory (WM), namely the
nature of capacity limits. Is the capacity best expressed in terms of the number of objects
held in mind, or in terms of the number of independently relevant attributes of the objects? If
it is the number of objects, does attention additionally play a role in how complete each
object's representation is? In recent years, considerable work on these issues has been
carried out using versions of the change-detection paradigm described by Phillips (1974)
and refined by Luck and Vogel (1997). In this type of procedure, an array of objects is
followed by a single probe object or a probe array, to be judged as belonging to the studied
array or changed from it. We re-assess the implications of this work for the knowledge of
attributes and their binding into objects in WM. Specifically, we address several questions
with improvements in methods: (1) whether attending to two kinds of attributes of objects,
color and shape, impairs WM of either attribute, despite earlier findings that they do not
(Luck & Vogel, 1997); (2) whether memory for the binding or association between
attributes amounts to anything more than memory for the two attributes themselves (see Vul
& Rich, 2010); and (3) whether attending to the binding draws resources away from memory
for the attributes themselves. The answers lead to a revised conception of WM processing
and capacity limitations.
New models (developed in Appendix A) are used to assess how many attributes and
bindings can be held simultaneously under a variety of different attention conditions, and
what the outcome means for models of WM capacity. The methods, variations of the
procedure of Luck and Vogel (1997) and a great deal of subsequent work, involve
presentation of an array of colored shapes (Figure 1), followed by a mask and then a single-
item probe to be judged present in the array or absent from it (Figure 2). The models are
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considered first approximations to actual processing, and departures from the models are
used to draw further inferences about processing. We now explain the background of the
inquiry into attention effects on information in WM, separately for attributes and attribute
combinations.
Attribute Information in WM
Luck and Vogel (1997) proposed that what is stored in WM is integrated objects. In several
experiments, they found that performance levels were similar no matter whether participants
had to pay attention to one or several attributes1 of the stimuli at the same time, a conclusion
supported by several others (e.g., Luria & Vogel, 2011; Stevanovski & Jolicoeur, 2011).
There are, however, other studies that are difficult to understand if the contents of WM are
fully integrated objects. In two studies, it has been found that knowledge of the color and
orientation of objects in an array are largely independent (Bays, Wu, & Husain, 2011;
Fougnie & Alavarez, 2011). Fougnie and Alvarez further showed that this near-
independence of color and orientation was not solely the result of mis-binding errors,
inasmuch as it persisted after removing trials in which the color of one object was apparently
bound with the orientation of another object. They suggested (p. 9) that “representations
may sometimes be lost at the object level in addition to the feature level.”
If attributes of an object can sometimes fail independently in WM, it should be expected that
attention to one kind of attribute should produce better recognition of that attribute than
when all attributes are attended, in contrast to the findings of Luck and Vogel (1997). Thus,
there is an apparent contradiction in the literature in need of further study. In the present
work, we re-examine the effects of attention on the retention of two common attributes of
ordinary objects, color and shape. Is attention to both attributes at once detrimental to the
recognition of either attribute?
One limitation of previous experiments of this sort is that they did not have as tools models
of the number of items encoded into WM. Several models are needed because different task
constraints require different logical arguments about the information available to
participants (cf. Rouder, Morey, Morey, & Cowan, 2011). Pashler (1988) developed one
model for situations in which the probe was a repetition of the array with one possible
change, shown in Appendix A (Model 1: Pashler Model). We develop a variant of that
model that is more appropriate for procedures in which a single probe is presented centrally
(e.g., Allen, Baddeley, & Hitch, 2006; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002); this is Model 2 in the
appendix, the Reverse-Pashler Model. Cowan (2001) developed a slightly different model
for situations in which the probe was a single object from the array at its original location
(Appendix A, Model 3, the Cowan Model). This modeling takes into account in each task
how much of responding is the result of chance guessing alone. The models provide
estimates of the number of objects for which a particular attribute is stored in WM, which
can lead to improved assessments of the effects of selective or divided attention.
Attribute Binding in WM
Another important and related concern that we address is the memory for attribute binding.
If a participant retains x colors and y shapes from an array of N objects, then how many
1We use the term attributes to refer to portions of the information about an object; in our experiments, the attributes are color and
shape. We use this term instead of the term features because we are not interested in the question of whether our attributes are in some
sense rudimentary or indivisible, as some would claim for features. An anonymous reviewer cautioned that the results, especially
pertaining to shape, might not generalize to stimulus features that could be described as simple and unidimensional, such as line
orientation. Perhaps allaying this concern, though, the superiority in performance for color as opposed to shape in this research was
slight, and is mirrored in a study of color and orientation (Woodman & Vogel, 2008).
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bindings does the participant know? If the colors and shapes are retained from the same
objects, the answer is x bindings. If, however, there is no correlation between the objects
from which colors and shapes are retained, the answer is xy/N, which is N times the
likelihood that both color and shape are known for a particular object. Here again, however,
there is disagreement in the literature. Gajewsky and Brockmole (2006) examined color-
shape binding in a recall task and concluded that these bindings endure even when attention
is switched away from the objects involved; color and shape recall were correlated. In
contrast, Vul and Rich (2010) examined letter-color binding in a five-choice recognition task
and argued that binding is nothing more than independent attributes that are retained for the
same object by chance.
In our Experiment 1, we re-address this question of how binding information is retained in
WM with reference to a type of probe that contains a color and a shape from the array, either
correctly combined or newly combined, with the shape from one array object and the color
from another (e.g., Allen et al., 2006; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002). We find that a new
model of items in WM must be developed especially for this type of binding task (Appendix
A, Model 4, the Binding Model).
We address the nature of binding in a different way in our second experiment, by asking
whether attending to both color and shape concurrently is tantamount to attending to their
binding. Thus, when binding information is required, sometimes new-attribute probes are
presented. Performance on new-attribute probes can be compared when attention at
encoding is restricted to that one attribute, spread across two attributes, and spread across
both attributes and their binding. If remembering bindings requires resources, it should
impair memory of attributes compared to when attention is focused on both of the attributes
but not their binding.
Methodological Issues
We make methodological contributions to the solution of the issues we have raised,
including concerns in stimulus presentation and analysis. A preview of these issues allows a
better understanding of our test orientation.
Probe arrangement and models of WM
The type of probe used in a change-detection procedure has implications for the model of
items in WM. Pashler (1988) developed a model of WM for a situation in which the entire
array was repeated, with or without a change. Although a priori one might expect that
situation to be simple because one is asked about the identity or difference between two
arrays, in practice performance is considerably degraded relative to the use of a single item
as a probe (Wheeler & Treisman, 2002). This degradation could come from interference
with memory of the studied array by the probe array.
The subsequent model of Cowan (2001) was based on the situation in which the probe was a
single object at the location of one array object, with probe attributes that may have changed
from the corresponding array object. The logic was that the participant only needed to check
that one item in WM. A potential problem, however, is that there is no proof that the
participant actually approaches the task in that manner. If each array can contain the same
attribute value (e.g., more than one red object in an array) then, of course, individual
locations of the attributes must be used to answer the question. In that case, though, items
with identical attribute values might be grouped together (e.g., Jiang, Chun, & Olson, 2004).
When such repetitions are avoided (e.g., Rouder et al., 2008), participants might actually
find it easier to search the entire array for the presence of a particular attribute rather than
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searching for the attribute at a particular location, given that the latter requires attribute-
location binding. That is an empirical question.
The question can be addressed by presenting the probe sometimes at a central location (cf.
Allen et al., 2006; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002) and sometimes at the location of a targeted
array item from which the probe may have changed. There should be an advantage for items
in location rather than at center, if the location information is used. Full evaluation of the
central-probe situation requires that a model be developed, our Appendix A Model 2
(Reverse-Pashler Model). In this model, the sameness of the central probe to an array item
can be detected, and if no match is detected the participant guesses. This is the converse of
the whole-array-probe model of Pashler (1988), in which a discrepancy between the arrays
is noticed or the participant guesses; the mathematical models are the same in form, but with
hits and false alarms switching roles between the two models.
The central-probe situation also can be used to address the nature of performance when the
probe is a recombination of attributes from a studied array item. When the probe is
presented at the location of a target item, location information can be used to determine if
other attributes are the same (e.g., color-location and shape-location binding information).
When the probe is presented at center, though, location information cannot be used. These
methods can be compared to determine whether location information is used. Again, a new
model is needed and differs from the model for new-attribute trials. For colored shapes, a
recombination can be detected if the participant has in WM either the object with the color
of the probe or the object with the shape of the probe (again, specific to the situation in
which there are no attribute repetitions within an array). An old item only requires the one
identical item in WM for detection. We develop and apply the resulting model.
Modeling limitations—Part of the contribution of the present work is the demonstration
that different models are logically appropriate for different change-detection procedures and
task demands. In order to accomplish this and to explore effects of attention, it was
necessary to make some simplifying assumptions. The models all assume that the attribute
values (different colors and shapes) were categorically distinct so that the precision of the
WM representation of an item, if it was present, was adequate to notice a change to a
different value. This is in contrast to other recent work examining the precision of the
representations of continuously-varying objects (e.g., Anderson, Vogel, & Awh, 2011;
Zhang & Luck, 2008). Our assumption of sufficient precision may not completely hold up
for shape stimuli, but in Experiment 2 we show that the consequences of insufficient
precision in this study are minor.
We further assume that WM consists of a fixed number of slots, an assertion that has been
widely debated in recent research (e.g., Anderson & Awh, in press; Anderson et al., 2011;
Bays & Husain, 2008; Cowan & Rouder, 2009; Gorgoraptis, Catalao, Bays, & Husain, 2011;
Thiele, Pratte, & Rouder, 2011; Zhang & Luck, 2008). The alternative (after Bays & Husain,
2008) is that WM is a fluid resource that can be spread thinly among an unlimited number of
items. This issue cannot be resolved here, though we strongly favor the discrete model given
the recent data (see especially Anderson & Awh, Cowan & Rouder, and Thiele et al.). Even
if the discrete assumption turns out to be inexact, the formulae are of practical benefit to
yield estimates of the number of items in WM in sufficient detail to allow accurate
performance in recognition memory tasks.
Finally, when the data depart from the models that we were able to design, these departures
are taken as further clues to processing.
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Elimination of extraneous memory codes
In our procedure, to eliminate extraneous memory codes, we include a pattern mask after the
encoding of the stimulus array but before the presentation of the probe (Figure 2). It is
possible that participants could respond to the probe on the basis of a sort of sensory
memory information that has lasted longer than the quarter second that is usually assumed
(see Cowan, 1988, 1995). To prevent that from occurring, a pattern mask is presented (cf.
Saults & Cowan, 2007). Indeed, there is evidence of a “high-capacity, but fragile” visual
short-term memory that is disrupted by a pattern mask (Sligte, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008, p.
1), at least after considerable practice (Matsukura & Hollingworth, 2011). Our masking
display occurs after a post-array delay assumed to be more than sufficient to allow all of the
array items to be encoded into WM, up to the participant's capacity limit (Vogel, Woodman,
& Luck, 2006).
Experiment 1
The goal of the first experiment was to examine memory for attribute and binding
information across a variety of attention conditions and circumstances to determine whether
attributes within objects compete for attention. The natural attributes of color and shape
were used, with a limited number of choices for each of these. There were 12 trial blocks
that differed in the probe type (new-attribute or recombined-attribute), probe location
(target-location or center-location), and attention condition (attend to color, shape, or both).
These variables are logically interrelated. Wheeler and Treisman (2002, Experiment 4B)
found no difference between these attention conditions, whereas Allen et al. (2006) found a
deficit for dual-attribute attention (but no further deficit for attending to the specific
combinations of attributes). These studies, however, based their conclusions on the
proportion correct. We re-examined this issue on the basis of the new models of items in
WM.
We presented trial blocks with the cue at the target location or a central location in order to
understand the use of location as an extraneous cue. For the trial blocks with new-attribute
changes, all attention conditions make sense no matter whether the probe is central or at a
target's location, but with an additional location cue in the latter case. With recombined-
attribute changes, when the probe was at a target's location, attention to just color or just
shape still made sense because the task could be accomplished on the basis of the binding
between the attended attribute and location. (Only the attended attribute could be
inappropriate for the location, belonging instead at a different location.) In contrast, when
the probe was centrally located, attending only to color or only to shape made little sense;
both color and shape were needed in order to determine whether these attributes were
recombined in the probe. Nevertheless, as a check for the effectiveness of our attention
instructions, we manipulated attention in this situation too.
Method
Participants—Forty-four undergraduate students (22 male, 22 female) received course
credit for their participation. They were native speakers of English.
Design—There were 12 trial blocks that differed in the probe type (new-attribute or
recombined-attribute), probe location (target-location or center-location), and attention
condition (attend to color, shape, or both). The order of counterbalancing was systematic in
a way that made the task easy to explain to participants, by minimizing the number of
changes in instructions from one block to the next. Counterbalancing always took place with
probe type as the slowest-moving variable, probe location as a faster-moving variable, and
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attention condition as fastest-moving. For example, a given participant might receive first all
6 recombined-attribute trial blocks and then all 6 new-attribute trial blocks; within each set
of 6, first all 3 center-location probes and then all 3 target-location probes; and within each
set of 3, first attend-color, then attend-both, and then attend-shape trial blocks. In each trial
block, on half the trials the correct answer was that the probe item was present in the array.
Eleven participants received each of the four possible orders defined by the probe types
along with the probe locations within each probe type, whereas the selection of the order of
attention conditions was randomly determined from six possible orders for each participant,
and held fixed within a participant.
Each of the twelve trial blocks began with an instruction screen that included a simple layout
of the rules for the block, a visualization of a same and a different trial, and a short
explanation of the type(s) of change that could occur. This was followed by several practice
trials (four each for attend-color and attend-shape trials, and eight for attend-both trials), and
last the test trials (16 each for attend-color and attend-shape blocks and 32 for attend-both
trials). Over the twelve trial blocks, participants thus completed a total of 64 practice and
256 test trials.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure—The experiment was conducted by computer in
one of two sound attenuation booths, with an experimenter present in the booth throughout
the study. Participants were informed that the study would consist of a series of trials, each
with a four-object visual array followed by a single probe object, to be judged the same as
one of the four array objects or different from all four in either shape or color (see Figures 1
& 2), by pressing either the `s' or `d' key, respectively, on a standard keyboard. A trial began
with a 1000-ms fixation character (x) followed by a 500-ms presentation of the array to be
remembered. Next came a blank interval of 500 ms, followed by a 500-ms visual mask
(multicolored squares with colors in irregular patterns, covering each of the four study item's
previous locations). The test item was presented immediately after the mask and remained
on the screen until a response was recorded, and feedback was then displayed reporting
correct or incorrect responding and instructing the participant to press the spacebar key to
begin the next trial.
The items presented on each trial were arranged as the four points of a square, their centers
separated by 4.2cm on each side, making the full field of view at study 5.6 cm by 5.6 cm (at
a typical viewing distance of 50 cm, 6.4 degrees of visual angle). They were selected
without replacement on each trial from 7 shapes (circle, square, triangle, star, a simple
concave shape [resembling an hourglass], a simple convex shape [resembling an eye], and a
cross [i.e. a mathematical `plus' sign with thick lines]) and from 7 colors (white, yellow,
blue, green, magenta, red, and black, on a grey background). All shapes had the same
maximum height and Working Memory for Features and Objects, Page 13 width as the 1.4-
cm square mask.
Probe type and probe location together defined the nature of the stimulus presentation
(Figure 2). The study phase of the experiment was unchanged throughout all conditions but
at the beginning of each trial block, participants were made aware of the rules of a possible
different item at test. For the new-attribute probe type, participants were informed the test
item, if different, would possess a new characteristic not previously seen in the four item
study phase. For the recombined-attribute probe type, the test item, if different, would be a
new combination of a color and shape already seen in the studied array. Within each probe
type, for target-location probe trial blocks, the probe appeared at one of the four original
study-item locations and was either identical to that item or differed from it in one attribute.
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For the center-location probes, the probe appeared at the center of the display and was
identical to one item or different from all of them.
Within each of these four stimulus conditions, there were trial blocks requiring attention to
color, shape, or both. Although the attention condition was applied in the same way
regardless of the stimulus condition, there were implications that differed according to the
stimulus condition, as follows. (1) In the new-attribute condition, regardless of the probe
location, the probe contained at most one attribute not present in the studied array, always an
attended attribute. (2) In the recombined-attribute condition with target-location probes, if
color was attended, then the shape was always correct for its location, whereas the color
could be correct for its location or could come from a different studied location (on different
trials); vice versa if shape was attended. If both attributes were attended, then either attribute
could change from the probed location in the array, but at most one attribute did change. (3)
Finally, in the recombined-attribute condition with center-location probes, there was only
one possible kind of different trial, the incorrect combination of color and shape from two
different array objects. In this condition, attention to only color or only shape was
incompatible with successful performance, even if the instructions encouraged it.
Results
Proportion Correct—The means in every condition of the experiment are shown in Table
1. We carry out most analyses on the measures of items in WM but an exception is cases in
which a model-free comparison is preferable. One model-free issue is whether the location
of the probe makes a difference. In one ANOVA, target-location and central-location probes
were compared, in each case including as another within-participant factor the seven
conditions from attribute-change trial blocks (change and no-change trials from attend-color
and attend-shape trial blocks; color-change, shape-change, and no-change trials from attend-
both trial blocks). The probe location made no difference, F(1,43)<1. Another analysis was
conducted on the attribute-combination trial blocks with both attributes attended, comparing
the three conditions with a target location of the probe (color change, shape change, and no
change) to the same three conditions with a central location. Again, the location of the probe
made no difference, F(1,43)<1. This equality casts doubt on the premise that participants use
location information to carry out just one decision, which would supposedly be more
efficient than comparing the probe with the entire array.
Given that, for attribute-recombination trials, the central probe made it impossible to attend
to just one attribute and still do the task, these trials were run only for completeness of the
design (footnote a in Table 1), but they also can serve as a manipulation check to determine
whether participants attempt to obey attention instructions even when doing so is not
strategic. Performance in this condition was indeed impaired by the instruction to attend to
only one attribute as opposed to both attributes (see Table 1), F(1,43)=8.18, p<.01 in a
planned comparison, p<.01, indicating diligent following of instructions rather than
optimization of strategies.
Items in WM
Identifying the nature of processing: Given that color and shape in the divided-attention
condition shared the same no-change trials, errors in no-change trials could occur because of
suspected differences in color, shape, or both. Therefore, it was not possible to assess items
in WM separately for color and shape in this experiment (a limitation that will be overcome
in Experiment 2) and we collapsed accuracy across color and shape in the estimates that
were used.
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The first step in the analysis of items in WM was to assess once more the use of in-location
information. For trials with the probe at the location of a target, when the participant
watches for a change to a new color or shape (or both), the model of Cowan (2001) was
based on the notion that the search of WM is restricted to the item probed. If so, there should
be some benefit of this kind of probe compared to a central probe, which requires that the
entire array be searched. On the other hand, the single-item memory search requires
knowledge of the location of the attributes to be searched, whereas an entire-set search only
requires that the attributes of the set be retained (given that there were no repetitions in the
array, to avoid grouping; cf. Rouder et al., 2008). Do participants retrieve the correct
location-color and/or location-shape binding of the probed item, or do they simply search for
the attribute(s) of the probe among all array items without regard to location? We carried out
an analysis of trial blocks with new-attribute changes using the Cowan (2001) model
(Appendix A, Model 3) for target-location probes and the Reverse-Pashler model (Appendix
A, Model 2) for centrally-located probes and found that the estimate of items in WM was
higher for centrally-located probes (M=2.80, SEM=0.10), than for target-location probes
(M=2.50, SEM=0.10), F(1,43)=7.66, p<.01, ηp2=.15. There is no good explanation for this
direction of difference unless the Cowan (2001) analysis is incorrect; there should not be
fewer items held in WM when the probe is presented at the location of the target. When we
use the Reverse-Pashler model for both central and target-located probes, though, the
inferiority of target-located probes is abolished, F(1,43)=1.70, n.s., with a slightly higher
mean for target-located probes. The working assumption we make therefore is that the entire
array was searched in this experiment, for new-color and new-shape change situations
regardless of the location of the probe. We thus use the Reverse-Pashler model (Appendix
A, Model 2) for all new-attribute change trial blocks, and the binding model (Appendix A,
Model 4) for attribute-recombination trial blocks.
New-attribute analysis: The new-attribute analysis of items in WM, with the type of probe
(center or target) and attention (one or both attributes) as factors yielded only a main effect
of attention, F(1,43)=10.84, p<.01, ηp2=.20. Attention to one kind of attribute resulted in
knowledge of 3.02 objects (SEM=0.10), whereas attention to both kinds of attributes
resulted in knowledge of the probed attribute of only 2.72 objects (SEM=0.09). Thus, there
is an attention cost to being held responsible for both kinds of attributes. The effect of the
location of the probe did not approach significance, F(1,43)=1.72, n.s.
Target-location analysis: This analysis included estimates of items in WM for trial blocks
with a target-location probe, with the type of change (new-attribute or attribute-
recombination) and attention (one or both attributes) as factors. The result was a very large
advantage for new-attribute changes (M=2.94, SEM=0.09) over attribute-recombination
changes (M=1.40, SEM=0.07), F(1,43)=239.01, p<.001, ηp2=.85. There was also once again
an advantage for attention to one attribute (M=2.29, SEM=0.08), over attention divided
between two attributes (M=2.04, SEM=0.07), F(1,43)=12.21, p<.01, ηp2=.22.
The reason why new-attribute detection capacity estimates are much higher than attribute-
combination capacity estimates, despite similar proportions correct in the two cases, has to
do with the modeling assumption about what information can contribute to performance in
our procedure. For new-attribute changes, only knowledge of the probed object is assumed
to be relevant. For attribute-combination changes, knowledge of two objects is directly
relevant. Specifically, the change can be detected if color-shape binding is known for either
the object with the same color as the probe, or the object with the same shape as the probe.
The absence of a proportion-correct advantage for attribute combinations despite the
relevance of more objects per trial is what produces the lower capacity estimate for bindings
compared to the new-attribute condition.
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Probe location effect for attribute-recombination trials with dual attention: Although
we have excluded trial blocks from our manipulation check of attention with centrally-
located probes for attribute-recombination trials, we can examine the effect of probe location
for trial blocks in which attention was to be spread across the two needed attributes. As was
the case for new-attribute trial blocks, the items in WM with a central probe, M=1.41,
SEM=0.11, were not significantly different from those with a target-located probe, M=1.25,
SEM=0.10, t(43)=1.39, n.s.
Discussion
The experiment leads to a better evaluation of testing procedures, an initial comparison of
item and binding information in WM, and an initial reassessment of effects of dividing
attention between attributes. These will be discussed in turn.
Evaluation of testing procedures—This experiment has led to several important
conclusions. First, it illustrates the limitations of various testing procedures. Most
importantly in this regard, it suggests a limitation in the use of a method in which the probe
is placed in the location of a target item. Specifically, for new-attribute change tests, it
cannot be taken for granted that participants will restrict WM search to a single location as
expected; that restriction requires binding of attributes with locations. At least, there was no
evidence of a benefit from restricting search in this way in our procedure, and assuming that
search is restricted in this way led to a significantly smaller estimate of items in WM with a
probe in target location.
Search would have to be restricted to a single location if a target color occurred more than
once in the same array. That kind of stimulus procedure, however, seems undesirable as it
would make necessary encoding of the binding between the attribute in question with a
location feature, and it also allows grouping between items in an array (Jiang & Chun,
2004), reducing the number of independent chunks to be recalled in a way that would
require an extra parameter in the model to express the likelihood that array items that are
identical on a relevant attribute are perceived as a single chunk (cf. Cowan, Rouder, Blume,
& Saults, in press).
Another potential limitation of placing the probe in a target location occurs for attribute-
recombination tests. The test for binding between attributes could be solved instead by
jointly combining each attribute with its location (i.e., color-location and shape-location
information used jointly). Placing the probe in a target location did not result in more items
in WM than placing the probe in a central location, though, suggesting that any such strategy
had little or no advantage.
One possible disadvantage of a centrally-placed probe, on the other hand, is that the probe
must be compared to all items in the set, not just one item. There is a potential cost of
multiple decisions (e.g., Palmer, 1995; Woodman & Vecera, 2011). Fortunately, the
mathematical models of items in WM were designed with that processing mode taken into
account (as was the model of Pashler, 1988). Also, the absence of repetitions within the
arrays in the present procedure limits the chance of confusion or grouping; for example,
there were no trials with a red square at one location and a red circle (or a green square) at
another location. Given that there was little or no advantage of placing the probes at target
location despite any drawback of the centrally-placed probes, overall the data suggest to us
that a central probe may be the best probe placement, especially when the experimental goal
is to include attribute-recombination trials to be compared to new-attribute trials. It is the
placement we use exclusively in Experiment 2.
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Item and binding information—The results clearly showed that the number of objects
for which individuals could retain attributes was greater than the number for which they
could retain attribute bindings. This difference should be viewed cautiously, though,
inasmuch as it was necessary to collapse the data across color and shape because they shared
the same no-change trials in the dual-attention condition, making it impossible to judge the
memory strength separately for color and shape attributes. It is possible that binding
memory is no worse than the attribute with the lower performance, which appears to be
shape (see Table 1). Information about color and shape separately will be obtained in the
second experiment, and it will therefore be possible to gain more detailed information about
the difference between item and binding information in WM.
Effects of attention—The data clearly showed that there was an effect of dividing
attention between attributes on the ability to retain any one attribute in WM. However,
according to the new models of items in WM, the decrement in performance amounted to no
more than about .2 to .3 items for each attribute. One way to understand the small magnitude
of this effect is to assume that, most of the time, attention to an object in order to encode one
attribute (color or shape) automatically resulted in the encoding concurrently of the other
attribute. (This would have occurred for roughly 2.7 to 2.8 items on average). Making one
attribute irrelevant allowed the relevant attribute to be encoded for approximately .2 to .3
additional items. There are many ways this could occur. As just one example, attention to
only one attribute could allow participants to notice a spatial configuration of this attribute, a
kind of new multi-item chunk formation. No matter how it occurs, this extra amount of
information retained when only one attribute is task-relevant turns out to be a relatively
small but significant factor in performance.
Experiment 2
The first experiment employed a typical divided-attention procedure, but that procedure
does not distinguish between effects of attention at encoding versus retrieval. For new-
attribute trial blocks, the retrieval task for divided attention differed from the task in focused
attention, inasmuch as the participant needed to search for two kinds of changes at once
(color and shape changes). In the attribute-recombination trial blocks, attention always
necessarily included color-shape bindings at both encoding and retrieval if the task was to be
performed successfully (with the possible exception that with probes in a target location,
attention could be directed to color-location and shape-location binding).
In Experiment 2, a new method was used to learn whether the effects of dividing attention
occurred during encoding or retrieval processes. On each trial, a verbal cue indicated which
attribute change was possible: color, shape, or color-shape combination. This allowed the
presentation of trial blocks in which the type of test was not known until the test probe was
presented. In attend-color trial blocks, only color test probe trials occurred, and in attend-
shape trial blocks, only shape test probe trials occurred. In attend-both trial blocks, both
color and shape probes could occur but, at the time of test, it was made explicit which of
these attributes could change. Finally, in attend-combination trial blocks, test trials included
color, shape, and combination trials but the participant did not know until a probe was
presented which information would be probed. Because of this arrangement, we could
compare the same color (or shape) retrieval probes with three levels of attention at WM
encoding: attention to the corresponding single-attribute, attention to both color and shape,
or attention to the specific color-shape combinations.
If the effects observed in Experiment 1 occur during encoding into and/or maintenance of
items in WM rather than during retrieval and response operations, then dividing attention
between color and shape at encoding should reduce the number of objects with color (or
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shape) in WM, compared to the single-attribute color (or shape) condition. This second
experiment allows the further question, which Experiment 1 could not address, of whether
attention to bindings draws resources away from the entry of attributes into WM.
A benefit of this new method is that it provided change and no-change trials specific to each
test probe situation, making it possible to examine separately the number of colors and
shapes encoded into WM even in the dual-attention situations (see also Wheeler &
Treisman, 2002). Until now this kind of information has not been used to support an explicit
model of items in WM.
Although it is theoretically possible to test for a level of detail beyond what was encoded
(e.g., asking for attention to color alone but probing the color-shape combination on such a
trial), we omitted such conditions so that our instructions would be believed.
Method
The final sample of participants included 29 native speakers of English (15 female) who
received course credit for their participation.
The displays on each trial were identical to the central-probe conditions of Experiment 1
except that each probe object had written just underneath it what kind of change may have
occurred (i.e., color?, shape?, or combination?). The task was to indicate by button-press
whether the change had occurred (change trials, with the response key marked d for
different) or not (no-change trials, with the response key marked s for same).
There were attend-color, attend-shape, attend-both, and attend-combination trial blocks. For
each trial block, the instructions indicated what kind of information might be needed on a
particular trial, and examples of the possible kinds of probes were presented. The trial
blocks were presented in an order that was randomly determined for each participant. In
each trial block, on half the trials the correct answer was that the probe item was present in
the array.
After the explanation of the kinds of changes that could occur in the trial block, with
illustrations, the attend-color and attend-shape trial blocks each continued with 4 practice
trials (compared to the studied arrays, 2 change and 2 no-change trials); the attend-both trial
blocks continued with 8 practice trials (2 color change, 2 color no-change, 2 shape change,
and 2 shape no-change); and the attend-combination trial blocks continued with 16 practice
trials (4 binding change, 4 binding no-change, 2 shape change, 2 shape no-change, 2 color
change, and 2 color no-change).
The test trials in the color, shape, both, and combination trial blocks included 32, 32, 64, and
128 trials, respectively, distributed in the same ratios as the practice trials at the beginning of
the block.
Results
Proportion correct—Table 2 shows the proportion correct scores for all conditions. The
accuracy was in a range comparable to Experiment 1. The comparisons carried out with
proportion correct in Experiment 1 do not exist in Experiment 2, and the analyses are
conducted in items in WM.
Items in WM
Attribute vs. binding information: The estimates of items in WM are again based on the
models shown in Appendix A (the Reverse-Pashler model, Model 2, for color and shape
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change probes and the binding model, Model 4, for combination probes). The results are
shown in Figure 3. A set of planned comparisons was conducted to compare color-shape
combination probes (rightmost bar in the figure) to all of the other probe types. The number
of color-shape bindings in WM was smaller than the number of colors or shapes in WM in
any other condition, p<.001 in all six comparisons.
Attribute and attention effects: The remaining conditions were analyzed in a within-
subjects ANOVA with two factors: type of probe (color or shape) and the attention
condition at encoding (single-attribute, dual-attribute, and color-shape combination). This
analysis produced two main effects and no interaction. First, the number of colors retained,
M=2.66, SEM=0.14, exceeded the number of shapes retained, M=2.30, SEM=0.14,
F(1,28)=7.17, p<.05, ηp2=.20.
Second, the number of objects for which the tested attribute, color or shape, was retained
with attention to only that one attribute, M=2.91, SEM=0.14, was greater than with attention
to both color and shape concurrently, M=2.31, SEM=0.18, or with attention to the specific
color-shape combinations, M=2.22, SEM=0.15, F(1,28)=9.49, p<.001, ηp2=.25. Newman-
Keuls post-hoc tests confirmed that the single-attribute attention condition mean was
significantly higher than the attend-both or attend-combination conditions, which did not
differ. The interaction term did not approach significance, F(2,56)=1.20, p=.31, n.s.
The advantage for single-attribute attention was numerically larger in this experiment than
in the previous experiment, but a cross-experiment analysis showed no interaction of
attention with experiment, F(1,71)<1.
Derivation of bindings from attribute WM: We carried out an additional analysis of the
data from this experiment to determine whether two assertions in the literature can be
reconciled. First, it has been asserted that divided attention does not impede memory for
bindings any more than it impedes memory for attributes (Allen et al., 2006; for further
support see Allen, Hitch, Mate, & Baddeley, in press). Second, it has been asserted by Vul
and Rich (2010) that the objects for which one attribute is encoded are independent of the
objects for which another attribute is encoded. These two statements could be compatible
inasmuch as divided attention would then be able to interfere with the encoding of binding
information only indirectly, by interfering with the encoding of the attributes needed for the
binding test.
If the assertion of Vul and Rich (2010) is correct, then one can predict that if the proportion
of colors in WM is x and the proportion of shapes in WM is y, then the proportion of
bindings in WM is xy. If the assertion of Vul and Rich (2010) is correct, then one can
predict that if the proportion of colors in WM is x and the proportion of shapes in WM is y,
then the proportion of bindings in WM is xy. This calculation requires the assumption that
each feature is associated with the correct object file (or location), so that the proportion of
objects for which both color and shape are encoded is the product of the independent
proportions of colors and shapes encoded. For example, if colors were encoded for 3/5 of the
objects and shape were encoded for 2/5 of the objects, the prediction would be that 6/25 of
the objects would include the information needed to notice a binding change.
Given our 4-item arrays, 4x colors and 4y shapes in WM leads to the prediction that there
are 4xy bindings in WM. We calculated the prediction for every individual based on the
attribute WM results in the attend-binding trial blocks (Figure 3, third and sixth data bars).
The mean prediction, 1.32 bindings (SEM=0.17), is slightly, but not significantly, higher
than the obtained result, 1.05 bindings (SEM=0.11), t(28)=1.55, n.s. If bindings were
specifically encoded, the obtained result should be higher, not lower, than the prediction
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because at least some binding would then reflect the encoding of color and shape
deliberately for some of the same objects, precisely in order to allow binding. We conclude
that Vul and Rich may be essentially correct and that, in this experiment, binding
information simply falls out when both color and shape of an object are encoded. (Later we
qualify this statement with the notion that a certain number of object files can be open, each
of which has at least one attribute encoded but still with no correlation between which ones
have color encoded and shape encoded.)
Although there is no strong need to explain the non-significant difference between the
predicted and obtained number of bindings in WM, it may be worth noting that it
theoretically could occur because of a tendency to encode color at the expense of shape on
some trials and shape at the expense of color on other trials, producing a slight negative
correlation between colors and shapes in WM within individual trials. This hypothesis
theoretically could be tested in a procedure in which both color and shape responses have to
be made on the same trial, but that measurement procedure could change participants'
motivation in such a way as to abolish any negative correlation.
Completeness of encoding: Related calculations offer a picture of the completeness of
encoding of items in dual-attention conditions. The number of objects in WM for which only
color is encoded is 4(x-xy), with x and y defined as above; for attend-both trials, M=1.01
(SEM=0.14) and for attend-binding trials, M=1.19 (SEM=0.11). The number of objects for
which only shape is encoded is 4(y-xy); for attend-both trials, M=.65 (SEM=0.10) and for
attend-binding trials, M=.62 (SEM=0.09). Last, the number of objects in WM for which
both color and shape are encoded is 4(xy); for attend-both trials, 1.48 (SEM=0.19) and for
attend-binding trials, M=1.32 (SEM=0.17). Figure 4 (last 2 bars) shows these different items
in WM stacked upon one another, separately for each attention condition.
WM capacity expressed in objects: Assuming independence of color and shape coding
also allows estimates of the number of objects for which at least one attribute is encoded
into WM. The estimate of items in WM for each attention condition is the summed height of
the bar shown in Figure 4. As the figure shows, the result is rather similar across conditions
(attend color, M=2.98, SEM=0.21; attend shape, M=2.83, SEM=0.16; attend both, M=3.14,
SEM=0.19; and attend binding, M=3.13, SEM=0.14) and the difference between them is
non-significant, F(3,84)<1. The estimate of about 3 items is quite close to what has been
observed in previous literature on visual array WM (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011; Rouder et
al., 2008).
Discussion
Several findings emerge from this experiment. First, we replicated the finding that the
number of bindings in WM was less than the number of attributes in WM. In this second
experiment, we were able to say more definitively that the number of bindings was much
smaller than either the number of colors or the number of shapes in WM, regardless of the
attention conditions at encoding.
Second, we replicated the finding from Experiment 1 that there is an effect of dividing
attention between two attributes of an object. Thus, it cannot be the case, as Luck and Vogel
(1997) asserted, that all features or attributes of an object can be encoded at once, as easily
as one feature or attribute can be encoded.
Third, we found that the effect of dividing attention on memory for attributes was essentially
the same no matter whether participants were required to encode both attributes separately
on each trial, or whether they also had to encode the specific color-shape combination
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(binding) information. This finding suggests that encoding the two attributes absorbed as
much attention as encoding the binding.
Fourth, we were able to provide a simple model suggesting that the information available on
binding trials was quite similar to what would be expected if the color and shape attributes
were independently coded, and were present in WM for the same object only by chance
given the number of colors and shapes encoded in WM. Note that we are not asserting that
color and shape are randomly paired to form objects. Each color and each shape in our
procedure presumably is encoded within an object file with a particular location attached to
it, so that what is random is the frequency with which both color and shape happen to be
encoded for the same objects.
Fifth, this model also yielded an estimate of the number of objects for which at least one
attribute was encoded into WM, and that number was not significantly different across
conditions. Across all attention conditions, the number was about 3 items, as in past research
on WM for objects in arrays (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011; Rouder et al., 2008). This finding,
especially, contributes to the overall conception of capacity limits that we will offer.
Sixth, and last, we found that there was a slight but significant advantage for color over
shape. Given a theoretical assumption of a constant capacity regardless of the nature of the
attribute (Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007), the inference is that the encoding of shape was
sometimes not precise enough to differentiate one object from another by shape as well as
was possible by color. This difference in number of objects encoded in sufficient detail to
allow a correct response was rather small, though (0.36 items across attention conditions)
and was not large enough to alter significantly the estimated number of objects in WM in the
attend-shape condition relative to the other three attention conditions.
General Discussion
The present results go beyond most other studies of change detection for object arrays by
including a wider range of encoding and retrieval conditions, and by assessing the results
with reference to new models to estimate the number of items in WM. Previous studies have
often overlooked the point that the correct model depends on procedural details (cf. Rouder
et al., 2011). We first summarize what we see as the most important findings. Second, we
elaborate on our rationale for characterizing the findings in the way we do, including
evidence for a constant capacity and evidence for attention-dependent inclusion in WM of
the color and shape attributes that we used. Then we propose a theoretical account to explain
these results, and last, we clarify implications of this research for the object concept.
Summary of Main Findings
We believe that the evidence presented here warrants a revised theoretical account. The
most important findings based on models of items in WM that we believe must be
accommodated include (1) a fixed number of objects represented in WM, about 3 on
average, regardless of the allocation of attention to particular attributes within these objects;
(2) partial completion of objects in WM, with some having only color representation, others
having only shape representation, and still others having both color and shape
representation; (3) variation in the relative proportion of objects having color versus shape
representation, depending on the direction of attention to one or both attributes; and (4)
knowledge of color-shape binding only to a degree that would follow if the distribution of
color and shape information among the objects in the array is uncorrelated (cf. Vul & Rich,
2010). The first three of these findings are compactly illustrated together in Figure 4; for the
attention effects, see also Tables 1–2 and Figure 3. A more complete compendium of
findings regarding items in WM is presented for convenience in Table 3.
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In Experiment 1, analysis of accuracy (proportion correct) also provided important
information about processing. Most importantly, the equivalence of accuracy for trials with
the probe in a target location versus centrally presented indicates that little or no benefit was
obtained from location information. Therefore, when Model 2 (the Reverse-Pashler model)
was applied to new-attribute trials from both probe locations, they yielded equivalent
estimates of items in WM, and when Model 4 (the binding model) was applied to attribute-
recombination trials from both probe locations they, too, yielded equivalent estimates of
items in WM.
Constant capacity for objects—The present research applies new models of the
number of items in WM and, in doing so, addresses some key unresolved issues regarding
the nature of WM storage, at least for visually-displayed arrays of colored shapes. The
results of the second experiment suggest that the number of objects that are included in WM
is fixed across variations in the direction of attention, at approximately 3 objects on average,
in accord with previous research (Anderson et al., 2011; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Rouder et al.,
2008). This kind of conclusion would not have been possible without the new modeling of
items in WM for various task demands (Appendix A), and without a method to examine
both change and no-change trials separately for color and shape within dual-attribute-
attention trials, as in Experiment 2.
Attention-dependent inclusion in WM of attributes within each object—Even
though the number of objects in WM is fixed, though, the completeness of the representation
of each object in WM is clearly not fixed, with some amount of competition between shape
and color, as both experiments showed. This finding contradicts the notion stated by Luck
and Vogel (1997) that when an object is encoded into WM, all features or attributes will be
retrieved just as well as they would have been if attention had been directed to only that one
feature or attribute. This notion, raised by Duncan (1984), already had been disproven for
objects consisting of pairs of colors (Wheeler & Treisman, 2002; Xu, 2002a, 2002b) but is
disproven here even when the two attributes are different in kind (color and shape). The
findings cannot be accounted for by a theory in which separate features have their own
capacity limits (Wheeler & Treisman, 2002).
In Experiment 2, we found that the frequency of encoding of bindings was slightly lower
than what would be expected if the selection of objects for the encoding of color and shape
were independent. With an object-capacity constraint, the discrepancy between observations
and encoding-independence-based predictions become even larger. For example, suppose
that 3/5 of the colors and 2/5 of the shapes are encoded. With no object-capacity constraint,
the expectation would be that 6/25 of the bindings are encoded, or 6/25 × 5 = 1.2 bindings
on average for a five-item array. With a capacity constraint of 3 objects with at least one
attribute encoded for each object, it is expected that 2.0 bindings are encoded (in this
numerical example, with color encoded for all three objects and shape encoded for two of
them). The fact that bindings were fewer than expected according to either of these
predictions strengthens the notion that there was a competition between color and shape
encoding, even in the attention condition in which binding was relevant.
On the surface, some previous studies have led to conclusions that appear to contradict the
attention effects of the present study. Bays, Wu, and Husain (2011) and Fougnie and
Alvarez (2011) found that errors on two attributes of an object are largely uncorrelated with
one another. Vul and Rich (2010) found that the ability to retrieve the binding between
features is a chance occurrence that depends on whether the two attributes happen to be
present for the tested object. However, the present results suggest that the collection of
attributes available for comparison depends on attention.
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Johnson, Hollingworth, and Luck (2008) previously found that a search task affected WM of
the binding between attributes (color and shape or color and orientation) only to the same
extent as it affected WM of the attributes themselves, reinforcing the conclusion of Allen et
al. (2006). The present research extends these findings to a situation in which the division of
attention is between attributes and/or their bindings rather than between the array memory
task and a separate attention-demanding task. It also is first to confirm the findings using a
principled measure of items in WM instead of accuracy and signal detection measures.
Locus of the attention effect: Encoding, maintenance, or retrieval?: The conclusion that
there are attention effects on the attribute composition of items in WM leads to the further
question of how these attention effects occur. Theoretically, they could occur at the time of
encoding of items into WM, maintenance of items in WM, or retrieval of items from WM.
Together with the existing literature, the present results offer clues toward the answer to this
question. First, we doubt if any of the arrays were incompletely encoded because of a time
limitation. Vogel, Woodman, and Luck (2006) showed that the time course of consolidation
of information into WM was about 50 ms per object. If we make the conservative
assumption that each colored shape in the present study takes 100 ms to encode, it should
take 400 ms to encode the entire array, whereas our arrays were presented for 500 ms, with
another 500 ms for further processing of the iconic image before a mask was presented.
Another possibility is that the situation at test determines performance. shape new-attribute
tests, we know that this is not the locus of the attention effects inasmuch as the situation at
test was exactly the same in the attend-single-attribute, attend-dual-attribute, and attend-
attribute-combination conditions, yet the results of these conditions differed. By process of
elimination, the attention effect seems to influence the information stored and maintained in
WM.
The model we have used as the analysis of items in WM for attribute changes with a center
probe (Appendix A, Model 2, the Reverse-Pashler model) is based on the idea that the task
is carried out by the process of detecting the identity between the probe and one of the array
items in WM, or by failing to find such an identity. It is worth noting that Hyun, Woodman,
Vogel, Hollingsworth, and Luck (2009) found a different pattern of results for difference-
detection versus sameness detection. The results suggested that difference-detection can
occur in parallel for all items in WM, whereas sameness-detection occurs more slowly in a
capacity-limited fashion. The point seems moot, inasmuch as the process of using that
change detection for a motoric response was still capacity-limited. Beyond that, moreover,
Hyun et al. used a whole-array comparison procedure, which meant that the sameness of
each studied array element had to be compared to the corresponding probe element in order
to answer the question. In contrast, the present procedure was one in which the items in WM
had to be compared to only a single probe element. According to the theoretical points
raised by Hyun et al. (e.g., in their Footnote 3), this type of procedure would not be expected
to produce a difference between in-location probes and central probes, and indeed none was
obtained (our Experiment 1).
In principle, as well, the similarity in processes between in-location and central probes
should apply not only to new-attribute tests, but also attribute-recombination tests. Indeed,
we obtained similar results for attribute-recombination (binding) tests with in-location or
central probes in Experiment 1, provided that attention was directed toward both color and
shape. Hyun et al. (2009, Experiment 5) found that attention could be directed toward one
attribute in two-attribute stimuli. We found that attention could be directed toward one
attribute or toward both, and the chance conjunction of color and shape information in the
same object was enough to account for the ability (and limitations thereof) in answering
attribute-recombination questions; hence, the superiority of new-attribute judgments over
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attribute-recombination judgments has to do with WM storage, not factors involved in
comparing WM representations with the probe item.
A Theoretical Account: Object and Attribute Limits
For the sake of parsimony we at first attempted to find a theoretical account of the data using
the same single capacity limit to account for all of the evidence discussed in the summary of
main findings. For example, a single capacity limit might be applied iteratively to color
apprehension and shape apprehension. The problem with this type of model is that the
binding data indicate that it is not routinely the same objects for which color and shape are
encoded; if these attributes were encoded for the same objects, the binding or attribute-
combination trial performance would approximate the same number of items in WM as in
the new-attribute trial performance. Instead, binding performance is much worse. This
implies that, in dual-attention trial blocks, the number of encoded items must include some
for which only color is encoded and some for which only shape is encoded. Indeed, in the
attribute-combination attention condition of Experiment 2 we were able to estimate that
encoding included both attributes for less than half of the items in WM (color only, 1.19
items; shape only, 0.62 items; both color and shape, 1.32 items).
Our general theoretical account of these results is summarized in Figure 5. The figure
includes two different capacity-limiting factors: the limit k in how many objects are
apprehended, and the limit in how many attributes can be filled in for those objects (cf.
Fougnie, Asplund, & Marois, 2010). In conditions involving attention to only one attribute,
the observed number of items in WM is presumably the same as the number of items for
which the attended attribute is in WM. In this account, the slight inferiority of shape
compared to color suggests that the encoding of shape is not always completely sufficient
for a discrimination to occur. This asymmetry is also found with other attributes. For
example, Woodman and Vogel (2008) found an asymmetry for color and orientation that
was quite similar to what they found for color and shape.
We leave open the exact manner in which the processing shown in Figure 5 occurs. One way
it could occur is if participants in dual-attention conditions attend to the two types of
attributes in series. For example, they could most often attend to colors first, retrieving k
colors, and then later attend to shapes, but only for objects whose color was already
apprehended, and then sometimes only for some of the objects. On other trials, shape would
come first and color second, but only for objects whose shape is already apprehended.
Alternatively, colors and shapes could be apprehended in parallel, but with the constraint
that any object for which either a color or a shape (or both) is apprehended results in an
object file (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992) that counts toward the individual's fixed
numerical limit in the number of objects in WM for that trial.
The calculations that serendipitously led to the fixed object limit shown in Figure 4 are
based on the assumption that no objects in WM are devoid of both color and shape
information (i.e., empty objects). Such empty objects would result if the objects were
established first in WM and the attributes were filled in later on a probabilistic basis. We
assume, in contrast, that such empty objects do not occur, uselessly cluttering WM, given
that the task is to apprehend color and/or shape information.
Role of location information?—In our account, as in Vul and Rich (2010), the ability to
know that a color and a shape belong together occurs for objects that happen to have both
color and shape attributes encoded. There are two ways in which this could occur. It would
be possible for the color and shape of the same object to be associated because both of them
correspond to the same location in a map of spatial locations (cf. Wheeler & Treisman,
2002). Alternatively, though, an object file (Kahneman et al., 1992) could be formed without
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regard to the location of each object. In this alternative, the color and shape associated with
a common object would be directly associated with one another, without incorporating
location information (given that this information was not explicitly needed for the task). In
Experiment 1 there was no benefit of placing the probe at the location of the target that may
have changed, either in new-attribute blocks nor in attribute-recombination blocks.
Therefore, we favor the account in which the color and shape can be directly associated
without location as an intermediary. This account also is in accord with the finding that the
capacity limit is the number of objects, not the number of spatial locations (Lee & Chun,
2001).
Relation to past accounts—This separation of the number of objects in WM from the
precision of the representations has been proposed before. For example, Xu and Chun
(2006) showed that one brain region, the inferior parietal sulcus, responded to a number of
objects with a fixed limit, whereas other regions, the superior intraparietal sulcus and the
lateral occipital complex, responded to a number of objects that changed with the
complexity of the objects. Anderson et al. (2011), after Zhang and Luck (2008), used a task
in which the precision of recall could vary to show that the precision of representations
decreases as the number of objects increases from one to two to three, reaching a plateau
after that number of objects. Thus, resources for processing object complexity must be
shared among items but can be shared among only about 3 items on average.
The present account is compatible with these prior works but adds three distinctions. First,
we suggest that the role of multiple attributes may be comparable to the role of the
complexity of a single attribute (e.g., Chinese characters for non-Chinese-speaking
participants: Awh et al., 2007) or the precision of the representation of an attribute (e.g.,
recall of the orientation of a bar: Anderson et al., 2011). When there are insufficient
resources available for the analysis of an object it can lead to insufficient precision of the
representation (e.g., insufficient detail about the Chinese character or insufficient
specification of a bar's orientation) or, as in the present study, it can lead to partial encoding
of the object (e.g., knowledge of an object's color but not shape, or vice versa).
Second, we assert that, by manipulating attention, it is possible to alter the type of encoding
of an object, in this case with an emphasis on colors, shapes, or some of each. Analogously,
it was found recently that the precision of the WM representation of bar orientations can be
altered at will when the number of items to be retained is not large (Machizawa, Goh, &
Driver, in press).
Third, unlike most prior accounts, but like Vul and Rich (2010), we also subscribe to the
notion that attribute binding information is simply the result of conjoint information about
the attributes for an object.
WM for Attributes and the Object Concept
The present findings still need to be reconciled with evidence that attributes form objects
with special properties. That is done with respect to several phenomena below.
Within- and between-object division of attention: Vul and Rich (2010) and the present
data indicate that questions about the binding of two attributes of objects can be answered
only to the extent that would be expected if the attributes were independently encoded.
There are two subtly different interpretations of that finding. Attributes may remain mentally
separate until the time of test. Alternatively, though, pairs of attributes that are encoded for
the same object may be mentally bound, so that the contents of WM include objects, some
of which are more completely described than others (see Figure 5). We favor the latter
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interpretation (cf. Allen et al., 2006) because it is more consistent with evidence on the
existence of objects within mental representations. Duncan (1984) showed that two
successive judgments of different attributes can be made without loss of fidelity if the
attributes come from the same object, but not if they come from different objects occupying
an overlapping spatial area. Awh, Dhaliwal, Christensen & Matsukura (2001) showed that
pre-cueing leads to a spatial source of advantage but that without a pre-cue, this special
advantage for objects remains. Woodman and Vecera (2011) extended this conclusion to an
array memory procedure more comparable to the present work. Therefore, we favor an
interpretation in which attributes are acquired independently but are sorted into objects that
are represented in integrated fashion in WM. This interpretation also accommodates the
finding that shape and color conjunction stimuli yield the same contralateral delay activity as
simpler stimuli and depend only on the number of objects in WM (Luria & Vogel, 2011).
We suggest that sometimes the representation of attributes within an object is incomplete
because of attentional limitations, though, in contrast to the complete encoding of multiple
objects that Luck and Vogel (1997) proposed.
Irrelevant attribute variation within objects: The present finding that attention can be
directed toward or away from attributes of objects might seem at odds with findings of a
disruptive effect of irrelevant attributes, but actually the findings converge nicely. In
particular, Logie, Brockmole, and Jaswal (2011) examined memory for location, shape, and
color, making one attribute irrelevant but varying and examining memory for the binding
between the other two attributes. At short retention intervals, varying an irrelevant attribute,
and especially varying location as an irrelevant attribute, had a very detrimental effect on
performance. At longer retention intervals (1000–1500 ms), however, the effect of the
irrelevant attribute variation was dramatically diminished. This effect can be viewed as
illustrating the time necessary for a visual object to be transformed by cognitive processes
into an abstract representation. In our study, the array onset to test onset interval was 1500
ms, a point on the function at which the effect of the irrelevant attribute has disappeared
according to Logie et al. This may be why we found no evidence of the use of location to
enhance information about color or shape attributes or their binding (cf. Woodman, Vogel,
& Luck, 2012). In future work, it would be helpful to examine the time course of the
selective attention effect, in particular the exclusion of irrelevant attributes and the
consolidation of relevant attributes in WM.
Selectivity between and within objects: It is an open question whether our observations of
selectivity among attributes within objects taps into the same attention processes used for
selectivity among objects. Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa (2005) found that individuals
with high spans could ignore bars of one color in order to concentrate on bars of another
color. It is not clear what the time course of this selectivity is. Ueno, Mate, Allen, Hitch, and
Baddeley (2011) found that, following an array to be remembered, an additional object or
suffix cannot be ignored, provided that at least one attribute is from the response set. We
suspect that both between and within objects, there is a minimal time period necessary for
the selection process to work.
If selectivity between and within objects relies on the same attention processes, the task is to
describe what the overarching limitations are in the use of this attention. Perhaps the key
processing occurs in the focus of attention, whereas some information can be retained
temporarily outside of attention, in the activated portion of long-term memory (Cowan,
1988, 1999, 2001). Thus, the initial apprehension of objects in the focus of attention may be
susceptible to an attention limit of about 3 items (Anderson et al., 2011; Rouder et al., 2008)
but in the case of items with complex or multiple relevant attributes, the processing of each
apprehended item may be incomplete. Once the items are apprehended, it is possible that
attention can be removed from some of the items temporarily in order to gain a more precise
Cowan et al. Page 19
J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2014 May 01.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
or complete representation of other items; attention to particular attributes can vary (cf.
Machizawa et al., in press). For example, it is possible that a single attended object could
occupy two slots in WM as the participant mentally processes the color and shape features
of that objects. Meanwhile, the unattended item or items would be retained in a temporarily
activated store outside of attention, though there would be limits to how long this could go
on without a return of attention to these objects as well. Some sort of rotation of attention
from object to object could occur at a rate limited by some capability of the participant (cf.
Barrouillet, Portrat, & Camos, 2011). It still must be worked out, however, why the
contralateral delay activity of event-related potentials would represent the number of objects
but not the number of attributes within an object including color and shape (Luria & Vogel,
2011).
Conclusion
The data we have covered may be considered complex, but they ultimately lead to a simple
resolution. There appears to be compelling evidence that attributes contribute to a limited
number of objects in WM, but that the set of attributes can be incomplete and depend on the
direction of attention. This conclusion comes from prior work but has been integrated here
across several different, previously separate lines of research. The conclusion also benefits
from the presentation of a wide variety of WM encoding and retrieval conditions in the
present work, and from the development of models of items in WM suited to the various test
conditions. Future work must determine whether our results apply to objects varying in
simple features, such as line orientation. Further work is needed as well to determine
whether the selection of objects and of attributes within objects for entry into WM both
occur in a single processing step, or in multiple steps separated in time.
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Appendix A
Derivation of Models for Items in Working Memory
The following models should not be considered capacity models inasmuch as the capacity
cannot be estimated if it exceeds the set size of 4 items. They are, however, useful estimates
of the number of items held in working memory. They are specific to the situation in which
features are not repeated within the array; no color or shape appears in more than one object
in an array.
Model 1: From Pashler (1988)
This model is not appropriate for the present study but it is an important starting point. The
model is appropriate for a situation in which the probe is an array that is the same as the
studied array except that a feature of one item may have changed. In this situation, a change
can sometimes be detected with certainty because the k items in working memory include
the item that has changed. If no such change is detected and the number of array items, N,
exceeds k, then a change still could have been missed and the participant must guess
whether that happened or not. The participant will guess “yes, changed” with some
probability g.
The term h is defined as the probability of a hit, i.e., change detection, and the term f is
defined as the probability that a change was indicated in the response when in fact none
occurred. The premises stated above imply that
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By combining these equations it can be shown that
Model 2: Pashler (1988) Modified for a Single, Central Probe (“Reverse Pashler” Model)
When a single, central probe is presented and k<N, the participant may be able to tell that
the probe item is not new because the probe item matches one of the items in working
memory. If this sameness is not detected, the participant cannot tell whether that is because
the probe is new or because the probe corresponds to an item that was presented but is not in
working memory. That is, the logic is the same as for Pashler's (1988) model except that
target-present and target-absent trials have switched roles. The correct indication of
sameness, (1 – f), occurs if the probe item is in working memory or if a correct guess of “no
change” is made, which occurs with probability (1 – g):
whereas an incorrect indication of sameness can occur only based on guessing:
Combining these equations,
If there were a probe presented at a target location but the participant ignored the location
information, again this model would apply.
Model 3: From Cowan (2001)
This model is appropriate if there is information about which item is tested and that
information is used. The formula for h is as in Pashler's model (Model 1):
but the formula for f is now different:
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because on k/N of the trials the participant knows that the probe is the same as the
corresponding item in the test array and therefore avoids producing a false alarm, given that
the item is in working memory. Combining these equations yields
Model 4: Color-Shape Binding Model
This model is appropriate when the probe for every trial is either identical to one of the array
items or consists of features from two of the array items recombined. When there has been
such a change in feature binding, the participant presumably will detect the change if
working memory contains either of the objects that made up the probe. For example, if the
array included a green triangle and a red circle and the probe item is a red triangle, this can
be detected as a change if either the green triangle or the red circle is known. The probability
that the participant has at least enough knowledge to detect a change, c, is the sum of
probabilities that the items included among the k items in working memory include both
those with the shape and color of the probe, just the one with the color, or just the one with
the shape:
Then the probability of a hit is
A false alarm, a response indicating a change in binding when there was no change, can
occur only if the probe item is not in working memory. Thus,
One can combine the last two equations to yield a formula that includes both hits and false
alarms:
Filling in the value for c, we obtain an equation that includes k, k2, and k3 terms and is not
convenient to solve for k. Instead, we selected the value of k for each participant and
condition that corresponded to h and f with N=4. This value is unique provided that k<3.0.
This makes sense because it takes knowledge of only 3 items to be sure of being correct in
the binding trial blocks within our procedure. If the probe item does not include a feature
from one of three items in working memory there cannot have been a switch in binding; the
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item must be unchanged from the studied array. A simplified lookup table is presented
below (Table A1).
This model applies no matter whether the probe is presented at center or at a target location
because the target location information is redundant. The binding between color and shape
defines which item is being considered, as do the bindings between color and location and
between shape and location, considered jointly. If, however, capacity estimates are higher
with the probe presented at a target location, this indicates that the redundant location
information is being used, a possibility that falls outside of the model as stated here.
Note that Allen et al. (2006) used a subset of trials with repetitions within an array to
attempt to ensure that memory for all four items was required. The assumption in the
binding model that only 3 representations are needed to identify binding change trials is
accurate for the present data but may need adjustment with respect to Allen et al.
Table A1
Estimates of k for the color-shape binding model corresponding to each combination of
correct rejections (1-f) and hits (h).
1-f h k
0.1 0.9 0.0
0.2 0.8 0.0
0.2 0.9 0.4
0.3 0.7 0.0
0.3 0.8 0.3
0.3 0.9 0.7
0.4 0.6 0.0
0.4 0.7 0.3
0.4 0.8 0.6
0.4 0.9 1.0
0.5 0.5 0.0
0.5 0.6 0.3
0.5 0.7 0.5
0.5 0.8 0.9
0.5 0.9 1.3
0.5 1.0 2.0
0.6 0.4 0.0
0.6 0.5 0.2
0.6 0.6 0.5
0.6 0.7 0.8
0.6 0.8 1.1
0.6 0.9 1.6
0.6 1.0 2.4
0.7 0.3 0.0
0.7 0.4 0.2
0.7 0.5 0.5
0.7 0.6 0.7
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1-f h k
0.7 0.7 1.0
0.7 0.8 1.4
0.7 0.9 1.8
0.7 1.0 2.7
0.8 0.2 0.0
0.8 0.3 0.2
0.8 0.4 0.4
0.8 0.5 0.6
0.8 0.6 0.9
0.8 0.7 1.2
0.8 0.8 1.6
0.8 0.9 2.0
0.8 1.0 2.9
0.9 0.1 0.0
0.9 0.2 0.2
0.9 0.3 0.4
0.9 0.4 0.6
0.9 0.5 0.8
0.9 0.6 1.1
0.9 0.7 1.4
0.9 0.8 1.7
0.9 0.9 2.2
0.9 1.0 2.9
1.0 0.0 0.0
1.0 0.1 0.2
1.0 0.2 0.4
1.0 0.3 0.6
1.0 0.4 0.8
1.0 0.5 1.0
1.0 0.6 1.3
1.0 0.7 1.5
1.0 0.8 1.9
1.0 0.9 2.3
1.0 1.0 2.9
Note. These estimates are for four-item arrays. For combinations of 1-f and h not shown, there is no unique, positive value
of k. A logical limit of the model is k<3.0.
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Figure 1.
Three screen shots exemplifying the study stimulus arrangement, background color, seven
object colors, seven object shapes, and mask (third panel).
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Figure 2.
Examples of the types of stimulus displays in Experiment 1(not to scale; with pattern fills
representing colors). Top row: Example of a trial in which there is a single-item probe in the
same location as the probed target item. Panel a, study display; b, masking display
composed of multicolored squares; c, no-change probe in the same location as the target
item. Second row: types of change probe that can occur in trial blocks with probes at the
target location. Panel d, change to a new color; e, change to a new shape; f, change to a
color from a different location; g, change to a shape from a different location. Third row:
types of probe that can occur in trial blocks with central probes. Panel h, change to a new
color; i, change to a new shape; j and k, two examples of changed binding between color
and shape.
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Figure 3.
Effects of dividing attention in Experiment 2, seen in estimates of the number of items in
working memory. Part a, color probes; Part b, shape probes; and Part c, recombination
probes. Estimates are according to the Reverse-Pashler Model (Appendix B, Model 2)
except for color-shape recombination probes, which are according to Appendix B, Model 4.
Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
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Figure 4.
Estimates of the number of items in working memory with each combination of color and
shape attributes in each attention condition of Experiment 2. The estimates are based on the
assumption that color and shape attributes are acquired independently and that each object in
working memory includes at least one of these attributes.
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Figure 5.
A schematic model of fixed capacity with incomplete attribute encoding in a dual-attention
situation.
Cowan et al. Page 32
J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2014 May 01.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
Cowan et al. Page 33
Table 1
Proportion Correct in Each Condition of Experiment 1
Probe Type of Trial Block
Attention in Trial Block and Changed Attribute New-Attribute Attribute-Recombination
Probe at Target Location
Attend Color
   Color Change .93(.02) .83(.02)
   No Change .81(.03) .80(.03)
Attend Shape
   Shape Change .80(.03) .75(.03)
   No Change .80(.02) .83(.02)
Attend Both
   Color Change .91(.01) .84(.02)
   Shape Change .73(.03) .70(.03)
   No Change .77(.02) .70(.03)
Probe at Center Location
Attend Color
   Color Change .95(.01)
.65(.04)a
   No Change .82(.03)
.74(.03)a
Attend Shape
   Shape Change .78(.03)
.67(.03)a
   No Change .76(.03)
.71(.03)a
Attend Both
   Color Change .89(.02)
.77(.03)b
   Shape Change .77(.03)
.76(.03)b
   No Change .72(.02) .74(.02)
Note. Standard error of the mean is in parentheses.
a
For recombination changes with a center-location probe, it is logically necessary to encode both color and shape in order to do the task, so
focusing attention on just color or just shape is counterproductive at best.
b
There is no difference in principle between color and shape changes in this condition, so in the attend-both condition, color and shape changes are
replicates.
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Table 2
Proportion Correct in Each Condition of Experiment 2
Presence or Absence of Change
Attention in Trial Block Change No Change
Color-Change Probes
Color .89(.02) .80(.03)
Both .86(.03) .71(.03)
Recombination .87(.02) .68(.03)
Shape-Change Probes
Shape .78(.02) .78(.03)
Both .72(.03) .68(.03)
Recombination .69(.04) .68(.03)
Recombination-Change Probes
Recombination .70(.03) .66(.02)
Note. Standard error of the mean is in parentheses.
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Table 3
Summary of Results for Items in WM According to Appendix A Models
Experiment 1: Trial blocks for 12 attention / probe type / probe location combinations
No indication that location information was used. In new-attribute trial blocks, more items in WM for centrally-located probes using the
Reverse-Pashler model (M=2.80) than for target-location probes using the Cowan model (M=2.50), contrary to the expectation for the use of
location information. Using the Reverse-Pashler model for both probe locations, no longer a probe-location effect. In attribute-recombination
trial blocks with dual attention (binding model), again no effect of probe location.
Effects of attention. In the analysis of new-attribute trial blocks, attention to one kind of attribute resulted in 3.02 objects in WM; attention to
both kinds of attributes resulted in fewer objects for either probed attribute (2.72). In the analysis of new-attribute and attribute-recombination
trial blocks for target-location trials, there was again an advantage for attention to one attribute (M=2.29), over attention divided between two
attributes (M=2.04).
Effect of the type of comparison. There was a large advantage for new-attribute changes (M=2.94) over attribute-recombination changes
(M=1.40).
Experiment 2: Center probes; trial blocks for 4 attention conditions
Effects of attention. The number of objects for which the tested attribute, color or shape, was retained with attention to only that one attribute,
M=2.91, was greater than with attention to both color and shape concurrently, M=2.31, or with attention to the specific color-shape
combinations, M=2.22. (See Figure 3.)
Effect of the type of comparison. The number of items in WM was much smaller for attribute-recombination trials (M=1.05 bindings) than for
new-attribute trials in any attention condition.
Attribute-type difference. The number of colors retained, M=2.66, exceeded the number of shapes retained, M=2.30.
Binding knowledge as derivative. The number of bindings present in WM could be reasonably well estimated on the basis of the assumption
that color and shape were independently encoded rather than correlated, and that the presence of both allowed binding knowledge.
Fixed object capacity across attention conditions. The number of items in WM with encoding of at least one attribute was not significantly
different across attention conditions.
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